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VOLUME VIII June, 1930 No. 3
JURISDICTION IN WILL CONTEST CASES
CHARLES C. PICKETT*
M R. Chairman and gentlemen: I am fully conscious
of the honor which has been conferred upon me in
inviting me today to stand before you as a representative
of the Chicago-Kent College of Law. It is an honor
which is very dear to me, and which I cherish highly.
It happens that in my experience, I can look back to
the time when the Chicago-Kent College of Law was be-
ginning its existence. I knew personally both of the men
who were the founders of the Chicago College of Law,
Judge Bailey and Judge Moran. Judge Bailey was on
the bench of the Supreme Court at the time I was ad-
mitted to the Bar. I knew also rather well Mr. Marshall
D. Ewell, who was connected with Chicago-Kent. I only
hope that I may be found worthy to follow in their foot-
steps.
In my experience in the teaching of law, I have had it
borne in upon me more times than I like to think of, by
young students, that they come to us with some ideas in
their minds which they have acquired outside of law
school, with respect to the subjects which we are teach-
ing. That has been especially true with regard to the
subject of Wills. I will not undertake to say how many
times I have had men come to me with this statement,
that, "I understand that it is the law that in order that
a will be valid, where a man disposes of his property,
*Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Address before
Chicago Bar Association February 14, 1930.
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leaving children, that he must give at least one dollar to
each of his children, by his will, in order that the will
may be enforcible." There is that notion that there
must be some specific thing or object given to each of
the children; I meet that very often.
I have encountered another impression, which has
led me to think about a subject which I shall discuss
with you today, and that is this, that in some way, or for
some purpose, a court of chancery has innate jurisdic-
tion in cases involving the contest of wills; that somehow
it was peculiarly appropriate that a court of chancery
should try such cases, and that that court, as a matter of
course, had that sort of jurisdiction.
That led me to think about this question, and, turning
it over in my mind, I thought I would see what could be
done in the way of taking the leading decisions in our
own state on the subject, and trying to find out how this
subject of jurisdiction in will contest cases had devel-
oped.
May I say, by way of definition, at the start, that by
jurisdiction, as I shall use the term, I mean the power of
a court to hear and determine a legal controversy, using
the word "jurisdiction" in its strict and narrow sense,
meaning jurisdiction as a matter of law; and I shall use
the words "contest of a will" to mean proceedings in
any court in which the validity of a will may be ques-
tioned, whether it is done by bill in chancery, by action in
ejectment, as between heir and devisee, or whatever the
form may be.
You will find my text today in the Gospel according to
Callaghan & Company, page 7803, of the Illinois Statutes
Annotated, in the footnote to Section 7 of the Wills Act,
where we find this language:
"This statute was originally adopted from Virginia
through Kentucky. In Virginia, by statute of 1748, the
English chancery remedy was adopted by the House of
Burgesses, and the period of limitation cut down from
thirty years to ten years."
It was certainly a very wise and able commentator on
the law who secreted those few sentences. In this par-
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agraph there are three errors. First, the Virginia stat-
ute, which was the forerunner of section 7 of our Wills
Act, was the statute of 1711, and not the statute of 1748.
Secondly, courts of chancery in England had no jurisdic-
tion over will contest cases as such; and thirdly, that the
limitation of the right to contest a will was thirty years
at the common law. I will dispose of that last sugges-
tion briefly, because it is the other two that I wish to es-
pecially refer to.
So far as the provision with regard to contesting a will
thirty years after the death of the testator was con-
cerned, that was purely a rule of evidence. At common
law, the presumption was that documents more than
thirty years old proved themselves. It simply meant that
a document more than thirty years old would be pre-
sumed to have been executed by the one whose name it
bore, and would be valid for the purposes therein set
forth.
In order to arrive at the facts as to jurisdiction in
cases of this nature, it will be necessary to consider in
some detail how a will might be contested at the common
law, and upon what terms and conditions, and in what
courts.
When the term "common law" is used, it is needless
to say that it is intended here to apply it as a short way
of saying the practice in any English court or courts
prior to the American Revolution.
With regard to the contest of wills in England, at the
very beginning, I want to draw a distinction, because it is
of the utmost importance here, between a will and a tes-
tament. Today those terms signify nothing. We speak
of the last will and testament of John Doe, deceased, and
we do not discriminate between the two ideas. But at
common law, a testament was the only instrument by
which a disposition could be made of personalty, to take
effect upon the death of the owner, while a will came into
existence by virtue of the statute of Henry VIII, and
was an instrument by which realty was devised.
A will, therefore, was an instrument disposing of re-
alty only, while a testament was an instrument disposing
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of personalty. The importance of that distinction is
that the Ecclesiastical Courts were the only courts where
there could be a contest of a will relating to personalty,
for those courts alone had anything like true probate ju-
risdiction; and so far as devises of realty were concerned,
there was no court that as such had jurisdiction of them,
and the validity of a will dealing with vast estates could
be tested only in an action brought at common law, in the
action of ejectment, as to which I shall say more later.
It will be necessary, therefore, very briefly, to take up
the question of the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical
Courts, with regard to the disposition of personalty.
We oftentimes forget that these Ecclesiastical Courts
have a pedigree as old and as distinguished as the courts
of common law. They came into existence by virtue of
what I may call a statute or a ruling of William the
First, who did in fact set up such Ecclesiastical Courts;
and those courts were in existence and had jurisdiction
in all of the dioceses, over which a Bishop presided, or
some other person duly appointed by him.
However, where there were subdivisions of the dio-
ceses, a subordinate officer presided over the courts.
We start out, therefore, with the Court of the Arch-
Deacons, presided over by the Arch-Dean.
In reading the cases, we oftentimes come across refer-
ences to the Consistory, or Prerogative Courts, and with
respect to them, it is sufficient to say that they were
Ecclesiastical courts of appeal.
From these diocesan courts, an appeal lay to the Pro-
vincial Courts of Canterbury and York, the first known
as the Court of the Arches, and the latter as the Chan
cery Court of York.
In addition to this, and right alongside, were the
Manorial Courts, which had ecclesiaslical jurisdiction in
the various manors, the Lord of the Manor having the
power of presentation; and a representative of the Lord
of the Manor presided in such courts. There were some
three hundred of them, more or less.
On top of that, we have the Prerogative Courts of Can-
terbury and York, and as you will recall, if you are famil-
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iar with your Dickens and your David Copperfield, you
will recall that Mr. Holdsworth in his very interesting
book on Dickens as a legal writer, refers to Doctors'
Commons in London.
At the time of the Reformation these courts were suc-
ceeded by the High Court of Delegates, to prevent ap-
peals to Rome. In course of time they were in turn suc-
ceeded by the judicial committee of the Privy Council,
with of course, an appeal to the House of Lords as a
supreme court.
In any of these courts there might be a contest of a
testament. In none of these cases was there any question
as to the power of a court of chancery to prescribe the
procedure. The procedure was clearly procedure sanc-
tioned by the canon or the civil law. The civil law gov-
erned as to the procedure, and the canon law as to the
substantive provisions.
When we come to the contest of wills involving re-
alty, we find ourselves using the action of ejectment at
common law. This is a fictitious action. I shall have oc-
casion a little bit later to emphasize something which
may not have occurred to you, as to whether or not there
is still the possibility of this action being in force in
Illinois.
The only mode of contesting a will disposing of realty
was by action of ejectment, in which the heirs of the tes-
tator were plaintiffs, and the devisees under his will
were defendants.
Without going into the fiction which exists in such
cases, it will be quite sufficient for us to consider the
issue raised in such actions. Always and invariably it
was the same; namely, did the testator, or did he not,
make the will in controversy, and upon which the defend-
ants rely?
With regard to the burden of proof in such cases, we
find, according to the authorities, that upon the trial, the
plaintiffs as heirs of the decedent, the testator, made out
a prima facie case by showing the fact of seisin in a com-
mon ancestor, the testator. Thereupon the devisees had
the burden of proof of showing whether or not the will
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was or was not valid. Being an affirmative defense,--
(if we do not like the phrase, "the burden of proof,"
we may substitute for it, "the risk of non-persuasion")
the burden of proof was upon the devisees under the
will, and in a contest in chancery under our statute, the
burden. of proof is upon the proponents of the will, the
devisees in the common law action being in the same
position with regard to the issue, that the proponents of
the will are under our Chancery Act in Illinois.
I shall use a few cases today for the purpose of sup-
porting the statements that I make. We have two cases
in Illinois in which our Supreme Court has taken up the
question of the historical development of will contests.
The first is the case of Luther v. Luther, in 122 Ill. 558,
and the second case is that of Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill.
243. I shall refer to a case in Virginia where the court,
when upholding the Virginia statute, gives us an inter-
pretation which should be followed in Illinois.
In Dibble v. Winter, the Court said:
"Where the question was as to the devise of lands the
probate of the will as to real estate amounted to nothing.
The devisee produced the will, and in such controver-
sies had to prove it as any other paper, as well as the
capacity of the testator to devise, on every trial."
And in the case of Coalter's Executor v. Bryan, 1
Grattan (Va.), page 76, which is a case, involving a con-
struction of the will of John Randolph, of Roanoke; and
which is one of the most interesting will cases that I
have ever come across, we find this language:
"In England there is no court of probate for wills of
realty; and consequently the validity of the instrument
must be decided incidentally in controversies concerning
the rights of property, claimed under or against it. These
controversies must be settled in the appropriate jurisdic-
tions. The title of the heir is in its nature legal, and may
be asserted in an action of ejectment; and he cannot go
into equity for any other purpose than to remove imped-
iments to a full and fair trial at law. If the devisee has
the legal title, he may, and the better opinion seems to be,
must, in most cases sue at law."
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Passing on now, we come to the next question, as to the
relation between will contests and the mode of probating
a will.
It is often said that the contest of will corresponds to
the probate of a will in solemn form.
As I have already indicated, the only contest of a will
possible was by proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts.
Will probate in solemn form might take place either with
respect to a will, of personalty or a will of realty, gen-
erally in the latter case, and then only in an action of
ejectment at common law.
Swinburne gives us what we may call the common law
with regard to testaments, and as to this question of the
mode of probate. I am reading from his text. I am
using the Fourth Edition, of 1677.
"The vulgar or common form is more compendious or
brief than the other, for, after the death of the tes-
tator, the executor presenteth the testament to the judge,
and in the absence, and without citing or calling of such
as have an interest, produceth witnesses to prove the
same, who, testifying upon their oaths, that the testa-
ment exhibited is the true, whole and last testament of
the party deceased, the judge doth thereupon, and some-
times upon lesser proof, annex his probate seal to the
testament, whereby the same is confirmed. When the tes-
tament is to be approved in form of law, it is requisite
that such persons as have an interest, that is to say, the
widow and next of kin of the deceased, to whom the ad-
ministration of his goods ought to be committed, if he
had died intestate, are to be cited, to be present, at the
probation and approbation of the testament, in whose
presence the will is to be exhibited to the judge, and peti-
tion to be made by the party which preferreth the will,
enacted for the receiving, swearing and examining of the
witnesses upon the same, and for the publishing and con-
firming thereof. Whereupon witnesses are received and
sworn accordingly, and are examined, every one of them
secretly and severally, not only upon the allegations or
articles of the party producing them, but also upon in-
terrogatories administered by the adverse party, and
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their depositions committed to writing afterwards, the
same to be published; and in case the proof be sufficient,
the judge doth by his sentence or decree pronounce for
the validity of the testament."
In the case of Luther v. Luther, 122 Ill. 558, at page
563, Judge Magruder, writing the opinion of the court,
used this language:
"In England the probate of wills of personal property
was exclusively vested in the ecclesiastical courts.
There were two modes of probate one ex parte, the other
inter partes. One was proof of the will "in common
form"; the other was proof thereof "in solemn form"
or "per testes". When a will was proven "in common
form", it was taken before the judge of the proper court
of probate, and the executor produced witnesses to prove
it to be the will of the deceased without citing or giving
notice to parties interested; it was admitted to probate
in the absence of such parties. When, however, a will
was proven "in solemn form", it was done upon peti-
tion of the proponent for a hearing, and all such persons
as had an interest, such as the widow, heirs, next of kin,
etc., were notified and cited to be present at the probat-
ing of the testament; interrogatories were propounded
to the witnesses by those producing the will and by the
adverse party. The executor of the will, proved "in
common form", might, at any time within thirty years,
be compelled by a person, having an interest, to prove
it per testes "in solemn form."
The mistake, as I see it, is in confusing probate in
solemn form with the contest of a will. This overlooked
the fact that there could be a contest in the ecclesiastical
courts only, and that such contests in those courts did not
take the place of a contest by bill in chancery.
I will refer now only to this fact, that in Illinois, prior
to 1897, our probate of wills was in what was known as
the common form. There could not be any such thing as
a contest in the probate court. However, in 1897 a stat-
ute was passed which provided for notice to all parties
interested; and since that time, as held by the court in
Pratt v. Hawley, 297 Ill. 244, all the provision has been
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changed so as to require notice to all parties interested;
and the statute makes the proceeding one inter partes.
If, therefore, it is inter partes, then we have this inter-
esting question, can we not now, under the statute, have
a contest in the Probate Court, and if so, to what extent ?
What are you going to say about the provision with
regard to fraud and compulsion, and now, by recent
change, forgeries in the execution of the will, as to which
you are not limited to the testimony of the witnesses to
the will, but may introduce the testimony of third persons
and outsiders, for the purpose of proving those facts?
Now we are coming to what I think is the most inter-
esting question that I want to discuss with you, and that
is the question as to whether a court of chancery as such
had any jurisdiction by virtue of its position, in con-
tested will cases.
So far as I can find, in going through the authorities,
there are four cases in which a court of chancery as such
may have the question brought before it, involving a will;
first, in what was known at common law as administra-
tion bills. We do not have them to a large extent in this
country, but they did exist at common law.
Second; there might be a will which involved the ques-
tion of a trust or the appointment of a trustee. It may
be that in that case, on account of jurisdiction over
trusts, the court would have power to act.
Third; a bill for the construction of a will.
And lastly, cases of marshaling of assets and equitable
exoneration.
In these cases, in the citation in Callaghan's Anno-
tated Statutes, to which I have referred, there is only
one case that supports the contention that a court of
equity as such has jurisdiction in will contest cases.
That was the case of Boyse v. Rossborough, which was
heard on appeal by the House of Lords, 6 H. L. C. 2, the
appeal being taken from the decision of the Chancery
Court. It is an Irish case, and that may explain the fact
that it is a revolutionary decision.
What do the American decisions tell us with respect
to that subject?
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In the United States Supreme Court-and I am not
going to read it; I will simply give the title of the case,
because my time is running short, and I want to get to
another point:
In Gaines v. Chew, 2nd How. 619, and in Kiely v.
McGlynn (Broderick's Will), relating to the will of Sen-
ator Broderick, 21 Wall. 503.
Gaines v. Fueenes, 92 U. S. Supreme Court, page 10.
I will read what the court says in Luther v. Luther on
this question:
"Outside of the statute, however, no right existed in
favor of the heir to go into a court of chancery to contest
the validity of the will. He could not go into equity for
any other purpose than to remove impediments to a full
and fair trial at law. The power to entertain bills of this
character is not embraced among the general equity pow-
ers of a court of chancery.
"Therefore, as the jurisdiction of courts of chancery
in this State to entertain bills to set aside the probate of
wills is derived exclusively from the statute, such juris-
diction can only be exercised in the mode and under the
limitations prescribed by the statute.''
In the last case, Havill v. Havill, in which our Supreme
Court has passed on this question, in the 332d Illinois at
page 14, it is said:
"The right to contest a will is not cognizable by a court
of chancery in the exercise of its ordinary equitable ju-
risdiction. The right is purely statutory. * * It
was a personal privilege extended to those interested
pecuniarily, to be exercised in the manner and time fixed.
It was not assignable by deed or otherwise, did not pass
by inheritance or devise, and could not be maintained
by anyone except a person interested at the time the will
was admitted to probate."
What is the origin of Section 7 of our Wills Act?
I wonder what we should say about this Act of Vir-
ginia of 1711, which you will find inl Hening's Statutes,
Volume 4, page 13.
"Jurisdiction was given to the county courts, to hear
and determine all causes, matters, suits and controversies
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testamentary. It provided that when a will devising
lands shall be offered for proof, the court shall appoint a
time for proving it, and cause the heirs to be summoned
and to show forth anything that may be lawfully alleged
against such proof, with the right to parties interested
to contest the said proof at any time within ten years."
There is the statute of 1711; thirty-seven years before
the statute of 1748. Both in Luther v. Luther, and in
Dibble v. Winter, the courts have made the statement that
our statute was based on the Virginia statute of 1748.
There was still another earlier Act than 1748; that of
1744, which amended the Act of 1711, by providing that
where the lands of the testator "shall be devised away
from the heir or heirs at law, such proof as to them shall
not be binding, and they shall be at liberty to contest the
validity of such will in the same manner as if the Act
had not been made."
As to the Virginia Act of 1748, I will say that our Sec-
tion 7 of the Wills Act is substantially the same as the
similar provision in the Act of 1748. This Act was
amended into its final form by the Act of 1785.
The purpose of this Act was, first, to recognize the
ex parte probate of wills, both of realty and personalty;
second, to extend the privilege of contest to include both
kinds of property; third, to prescribe a period of limi-
tation for such contests; and fourth, to change the status
of the parties; the parties suing being those that were
interested in sustaining rather than in overturning the
will; fifth, to shift the final probate to courts of chan-
cery; that is, to permit the use of documentary proof of
the original probate of the will, and in that respect being
in line with section 7 of our own Wills Act.
In passing upon the Virginia statute, in the case of
Coalter's Executor v. Bryan, supra, the Supreme Court
of Virginia says:
"The jurisdiction is merely that of a court of probate,
and to be exercised, not by the court, but by a jury under
its supervision."
We have something still more important. As you
know, Illinois was at one time part of the Northwest Ter-
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ritory, and as part of the Northwest Territory, it was in
turn, part of Indiana. Then it became a territory by it-
self. The Ordinance of 1787 provided, among other
things, that the judges of the Northwest Territory should
prepare a code of laws for the Territory, and that such
laws should be taken from the laws of the Thirteen Orig-
inal States. We find now, in Maxwell's Code of 1795, a
very significant provision, which clearly indicated that
there could be a contest of a will. I am referring to the
Act of the 19th of June, 1795:
"If any will shall, within seven years after the tes-
tator's death, appear to be disproved or annulled before
any judge or officer having cognizance thereof, then it
shall be lawful for the party aggrieved, or his or their
heirs, executors or assigns, to have their action for what
shall be taken or detained, or have their writ or writs of
error for reversing the judicial proceedings thereupon."
This clearly indicates that originally the Probate Court
under this section had the power to entertain the contest
of a will.
This Act of the Northwest Territory was taken from
the laws of the State of Pennsylvania, and we find the
Act in Reed's Digest of Pennsylvania Laws, (1801) at
page 384. This Act of the Northwest Territory was
adopted by the judges of Indiana Territory, and included
in the Indiana territorial laws of 1807-11, at pages 84 to
88. It again was adopted by the judges of the Territory
of Illinois, and included in Pope's Laws of Illinois Ter-
ritory, pages 215 and 216.
It was the basis of the Act which we find in the statutes
in 1819. And so you see that Section 7 of the Wills Act
has, if I may use the phrase, two parents. It has, on the
one side, an origin which can be traced back to the laws of
Pennsylvania, which gave power to entertain contests to
the probate court, and it also came from Virginia
through Kentucky-and I may say that the Virginia stat-
ute of 1748 was adopted by Kentucky and was made the
law of that jurisdiction, and that you will find in the
Acts of Kentucky of 1797, page 611. This statute was
construed in the case of Rogers v. Thomas, 1 B. Monroe,
390.
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In view of this, I wish to call your attention to a de-
cision of Judge Pinckney Walker, of our own Supreme
Court, in the case of Duncan v. Duncan. You will find
this in 23 Ill. 306, where it says:
"From these several provisions, when considered to-
gether, it is apparent that the legislature designed to
permit parties in interest, to contest the validity of the
will, testament or codicil as well in the probate court as
by a bill in chancery. It could not have been the inten-
tion to confine it to the latter mode, or the provisions of
the second and thirty-fifth sections would not have been
adopted, but the design must have been to authorize
both modes."I
I am aware of the fact that in the case of Berger v.
Berger, in 317 Ill. at 406, Judge Dunn, who wrote the
opinion of the court, said that he does not know how the
mode of contesting suits, as stated in Duncan v. Duncan,
is possible.
One last word in regard to the form of action. The
action to probate a will, whether in the Probate Court or
elsewhere, is in form an action in rem. The res involved
is whether or not the instrument is in fact, the will of the
testator. That is the only issue upon the original pro-
bate of the will, or upon appeal to the Circuit Court from
an order either granting or denying probate, or upon a
contest in chancery.
I will sum up.
1. At common law testaments of personalty could be
contested only in the ecclesiastical courts, and a devise
of realty only in an action of ejectment in a suit at law.
2. • There is no connection whatever between the mode
of probate, common and solemn, and the contest of a will
or testament.
3. There was no court having jurisdiction of wills re-
lating solely to realty. The will had to be proved every
time and in whatever court its validity was questioned,
and a contest was possible on every such occasion.
4. The court of chancery as such had no jurisdiction
of the contest either of wills or testaments, by virtue of
its existence as a court of chancery. The origin of our
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statutory provisions with regard to will contests came
partly from Pennsylvania, partly from Virginia, and
partly from Kentucky.
Under our statute, a will contest is in substance, an
action at law, a substitute for the old action of ejectment.
The issue is devisavit vel non, as in that case.
Lastly, under our Ejectment Act, Section 1 it is pro-
vided that wherever the action of ejectment could be
maintained at common law, the same shall be preserved
under Section 2, which section says that it may also be
brought in the same cases in which a writ of right may
now be brought by law, to recover land, tenements or
hereditaments, by any person claiming an estate therein,
in fee, for life or for years, either as heir, devisee or
purchaser.
If this is true, then it ought to be possible today to
contest a will of realty in an action of ejectment at com-
mon law, the remedy by ejectment being in addition to
and not exclusive of the right to contest in chancery.
